On 5 February 2025, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) announced that it will conduct five new general market investigations in 2025. In these market investigations, the ACM will specifically look at veterinarians, education tools (including digital ones), computer-driven consumer prices, the budget segment of the fixed broadband market, and the development of the hydrogen market. In this way, ACM carries out its duty of exercising general oversight over the proper functioning of markets, even without a suspicion of violation of the rules. In these broad market investigations, ACM looks at deeper causes and effects of markets that do not function properly, and it puts forward solutions to make these markets function better.

Interestingly, the market for veterinarian practices and surgeries is also the subject of a market investigation by the Consumers and Markets Authority (CMA) in the UK, although the CMA is almost a year ahead in its investigation, see this blog post. It seems that the ACM is shifting its focus from competition law enforcement to market investigations in 2025, whilst continuing its plea for additional regulatory powers to not only conclude with recommendations, but also intervene in the functioning of markets to remedy perceived imperfections and failures.

ACM takes inspiration from the UK for its methodology

One day later, the ACM published its procedural framework for market investigations, describing the investigative stages as well as the public statements and interactions with stakeholders during these investigations. 

In this Methodology for market investigations (available in Dutch only), the ACM appears to have been inspired by procedural framework for market investigations by the UK CMA when it comes to publication of an issues statement at the start of an investigation and publication and consultation of a draft report. But apart from the discussion of whether or not the ACM should be given the power to impose remedies to rectify structural competition problems identified during a market investigation (often referred to as the New Competition Tool), there are some notable differences in comparison with the market investigations regime in the UK.

The most notable differences in the ACM’s methodology compared to the UK regime are the lack of deadlines for the different stages of the market investigation and the absence of external supervision of the ACM’s investigation. 

In the UK, market investigation procedures are subject to strict deadlines. The duration of a market investigation may not exceed 18 months, which is extendable by six months in exceptional circumstances. Within that timescale, there are a number of stages to the investigation, which will be set out in an administrative timetable published at the start of the investigation. These stages include the publication of an early issues statement, setting out the proposed scope of the investigation and specific questions it will be addressing, evidence gathering including a series of site visits and hearings with parties and other interest groups, publication of a provisional findings decision (after about 12 months), further hearings and then the provisional decision on remedies (if required) before publication of the final report.

Moreover, in the UK, market investigations are not conducted under the authority of the CMA but led by a group drawn from the CMA’s panel of members which can not only report on market failures, but also impose remedies to rectify those. The CMA’s panel comprises individuals from a variety of backgrounds (economics, law, public sector, business), all eminent in their field. The market investigation is undertaken independently of the CMA Board, and members of the group are the sole decision-makers in the investigation. The group is supported by a team of staff, including specialists providing advice on economic, legal and accounting matters. The ACM has been given a general competence to conduct market  studies or market investigations (there is not really any difference under Dutch law), but is limited in acting on the outcome. It can only identify market failures and recommend regulatory remedies to the legislator or call on industry sectors to amend certain types of conduct.

Summary of the ACM’s market investigation procedures

In its market investigation paper, the ACM gives a helpful overview of its methodology by providing an infographic of the steps as well as the moment at which publications and interactions with stakeholders take place. 

However, there is no indication of the timing in the ACM methodology, so market investigations can drag on for a long time before reaching a conclusion. And with 5 investigations in parallel, it is at least uncertain how expedient this procedure will be in practice. 

It will also become clearer in 2025 whether the ACM’s push for being given a New Competition Tool (NCT) will succeed. Its chair, Martijn Snoep, is unwavering in his plea that it is necessary to effectively address and remedy market failures. In his recent speech on the subject (Dutch only), Snoep outlined the need for an NCT, drawing strength from the Draghi report on European competitiveness to support his plea. The mere (existing) powers to conduct a market investigation and conclude with recommendations for regulatory intervention by the government proves ineffective, Snoep said, pointing at recommendations made (in 2025) to the competent ministries following the ACM’s 2021 investigation into the market for healthcare ICT and the 2024 investigation into the savings market.

One thing is certain, if the ACM gets its long-desired NCT, it will make use of it. The launch of 5 market investigations seems to indicate that ACM is anticipating this new instrument. But whether ACM will put as much effort into competition law enforcement as into the exploration of its new toolkit, remains to be seen.

The remainder of 2025 will tell…

If you would like more information or further guidance on this topic, please contact Pauline Kuipers. 

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