Introduction 

On 2 June 2025, the European Commission announced imposing fines totaling EUR 329 million on Delivery Hero and Glovo for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector (link).  According to the European Commission, their actions constituted an infringement under Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”) and Article 53 of the European Economic Area Agreement by i) agreeing not to poach each other’s employees, ii) exchanging commercially sensitive information, and iii) allocating geographic markets. Because Delivery Hero and Glovo settled the case with the Commission, there was a 10% reduction of the fine in accordance with the 2008 Settlement Notice. For now, the decision has not yet been published, but the fine has been announced in a press release. This case is noteworthy as it is the first fine issued by the European Commission for ‘no-poach’ agreements and because it deals with the competition law risks of taking a minority stake in a competing company. 

Delivery Hero and Glovo’s Relation 

The Germany-based Delivery Hero and Spain-based Glovo were competing online food delivery companies. In July 2018, Delivery Hero obtained a minority no-controlling stake in Glovo, and in July 2022, Glovo was fully acquired and became one of Delivery Hero’s subsidiaries. Following unannounced inspections in June 2022 and November 2023, and a market monitoring exercise, the European Commission started a formal competition law investigation into Delivery Hero and Glovo. It found that in the four years that Delivery Hero had held a minority stake in Glovo, this horizontal minority-ownership had resulted in several anti-competitive practices.

No-Poach Agreement 

First, Delivery Hero and Glovo had agreed on a ‘no-poach agreement’ which meant that they would not approach each other’s employees with job offers. According to the Statement of Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition, this agreement included reciprocal no-hire clauses, which applied to all employees except delivery riders. Such no-poach agreements are deemed harmful to employees because they restrict competition between companies, resulting in lower wages and fewer options. In a Competition Policy Brief of the European Commission, it is stated that ‘no poach agreements’ are therefore classified as a ‘restriction by object’, which means that there is no requirement to prove negative effects on competition in the specific case. These agreements are considered to fall into the categories of purchase price-fixing and market sharing prohibited under Article 101(1)(a) and (c) TFEU (link). 

Exchanging Sensitive Information 

Second, the Commission found that the companies had exchanged commercially sensitive information, including information on commercial strategies and prices.

The Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (“Horizontal Guidelines”) explicitly mention that information exchange between competitors that may result in price-fixing is likely to restrict competition by object (link). According to Commissioner Ribera, the exchanged information between Delivery Hero and Glovo included “current pricing strategies and future pricing intentions” and therefore violated article 101 TFEU. 

Through the minority share in Glovo, Delivery Hero and Glovo shared information on commercial strategies, by holding meetings, spreading strategy plans, and current and future commercial strategies. Such data exchange, which influences decision-making and limits competition, amounts to prohibited concerted practices. 

Allocating Markets 

Third, the investigation found that the companies actively divided national markets between one another by discussing each other’s presence, avoiding having presence in the same market, and selling each other their business when they were both present in the same market.

As a minority shareholder, Delivery Hero also used its position to convince Glovo’s management to share markets, by threatening to use its voting rights in decision-making, and by influencing other stakeholders.

Such geographical market partitioning significantly reduces competition because there is no incentive for companies to lower prices, and consumers do not have the possibility to compare prices. Indeed, consumers were no longer able to compare Deliver Hero and Glovo’s prices in the respective food delivery apps.

Especially when such arrangements are reciprocal, the object is likely to restrict competition according to paragraph 332 of the Horizontal Guidelines, amounting to a (by object) breach of article 101 (1) (a) TFEU.

Wider Implications: Enforcement on a European Level

Vice-President Ribera stated that it is “the first time the Commission is sanctioning a no-poach agreement.” Indeed, considering their national or local character, most no-poach agreements have been addressed by the competition authorities, rather than at the European level. One recent example is the Belgian National Competition Authority issuing a fine of over EUR 47 million for restrictive practices which included a no-poach agreement (link).

Further, it is important to consider that, while companies are allowed to be minority shareholders in their competitors, they should be careful not to cross the boundary of competition law. In particular, they should actively ensure that these minority stakes do not lead to information sharing that goes beyond the information necessary for investors. Also, more generally, they should avoid using their shareholding position to engage in anti-competitive activities or no-poach agreements. This case clearly signals that companies should be very cautious when holding or acquiring a minority stake in rival companies.

For more information or further guidance in this area, please contact Pauline Kuipers and Joost van Roosmalen. 

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