Uber’s below-threshold acquisition of Dantaxi called in by the DCCA

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (“DCCA”) has ruled that Uber International Holding B.V.’s (“Uber”) acquisition of Greenfleet Holding A/S, the parent company of Dantaxi4x48 A/S (“Dantaxi”), must be formally notified for a merger control review by the DCCA.

Although the merger was completed in May 2025, the DCCA concluded that the transaction, following a preliminary review of the facts, raises competition concerns significant enough to require a notification of the merger pursuant to Article 12(6) of the Danish Competition Act.

This right to call-in below-threshold transactions was introduced in July 2024, giving the DCCA the power to call-in, for review, transactions that do not meet the ordinary turnover thresholds.

Legal basis and competition law concerns

Article 12(6) of the Danish Competition Act allows the DCCA to require notification of mergers that do not meet the ordinary quantitative turnover thresholds if (i) the parties have a combined turnover in Denmark exceeding DKK 50 million and (ii) there is a risk that the merger will significantly impede effective competition. 

The DCCA considered that both conditions were satisfied. Indeed, the parties to the transaction each generated Danish turnover exceeding the quantitative threshold, and the authority’s preliminary assessment indicated that the transaction may give rise to both unilateral and coordinated effects in relevant markets. 

As to the qualitative threshold, the DCCA identified two potentially relevant markets being:

1. taxi services, which could be both local and national in scope, and 
2. intermediation and dispatch of taxi services, which were assessed as national in scope.

The DCCA considered that Uber’s partnership with Drivr — a growing competitor in the Copenhagen taxi market —allowed Uber to exert significant competitive pressure on Dantaxi before the transaction. With the acquisition, both Drivr’s and Dantaxi’s services would be available through Uber’s app, meaning that end-users may no longer perceive them as distinct competitive alternatives. The DCCA therefore considered that the merger might reduce the intensity of competition between Dantaxi and Drivr.

On the market for taxi dispatch services, the DCCA expressed concern that Uber’s role as a central intermediary for both Dantaxi and Drivr could strengthen its market position to a degree that hinders effective competition. With more than half of the market potentially channeled through Uber’s platform, the authority warned of risks such as higher service fees for drivers, reduced innovation, and barriers for smaller competitors due to strong network effects.

OneMed and Kirstine Hardam – second call-in in two days

On 26 August, just a day after the call-in of the Uber-Dantaxi acquisition, the DCCA decided to call in OneMed’s acquisition of Kirstine Hardam — a wholesaler specialising in ostomy care products - for further review. Following the merger, OneMed/Kirstine Hardam would become the largest player in the Danish market for ostomy care products and related services supplied to municipalities. As this market already has only a few participants, the creation of such a dominant player raised concerns that the merger could significantly restrict competition. The DCCA’s assessment draws, among other things, on its experience from the Coloplast abuse of dominance case decided in January 2025, which concerned the very same market.

Next steps for the called-in transactions

Uber must submit a full merger notification by 15 September 2025. The DCCA will then carry out a detailed review of the merger to determine whether the acquisition should be cleared, approved with remedies, or prohibited. As significant concerns have been expressed by the DCCA prior to the notification, the stakes in Phase 1 become higher and will be, in practice, more like starting with a Phase 2 investigation.

As the acquisition of Kirstine Hardam by OneMed has not yet been completed, the merger must be notified to the DCCA, but no specific deadline has been given for this. Once notified, the authority will conduct a full review of the impact on effective competition arising from the merger, to determine whether intervention is necessary. 

A broad scope for call-in rules in Denmark?

The preparatory works of the call-in rules initially indicated that the DCCA primarily wished to counteract potential “killer acquisitions” in innovative markets. 

However, both transactions in question were largely based on traditional theories of harm arising from pre-existing horizontal and/or vertical overlaps. Moreover, whilst the Uber/Dantaxi acquisition deals with the impact of the platform economy on a traditional sector, taxi services, the OneMed/Kirstine Hardam acquisition concerns a “traditional” trading market.

The cases demonstrate that the DCCA is prepared to use the call-in rules extensively, meaning companies should be mindful that transactions in both innovative, as well as in traditional markets, may be subject to review even if they fall below the usual turnover thresholds.

This means that dealmakers will have to take the Danish call-in risk into consideration in SPA negotiations and timelines. It further means that a substantive competition law analysis will be necessary in many below-threshold mergers, including a thorough analysis of whether competitors are likely to complain or not. Finally, it must be considered whether it is necessary to enter into pre-discussions with the DCCA, which may increase certainty as to whether deals will be called-in or not, but still cannot rule out transactions being called in due to the market information provided to the DCCA by third-parties.

Bird & Bird is actively involved in the Uber/Dantaxi acquisition, representing a third-party complainant.

For more information or guidance in this area, please contact Morten Nissen, Alexander Brøchner or Pauline Holm Jørgensen.

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